The box of chocolate analogy proves that some relations could very easily be established by assumption. There is no way it could survive after its death: Or is it an empirical correlation, a well-confirmed regularity, known through experience that holds on earth but does not have to true everywhere else such as in heaven?
Cohen enters at this point and claims that the important difference between actual memories and merely apparent memories is that the former are causally connected in the right sort of way to the happenings of the world.
In lecture, I gave the example of swapping my current body for a younger, more fit one, thus showing that such a situation is at least imaginable. We might leave the game for ten minutes and when we come back a new inning has begun.
According to Sam, one would survive after death because he keeps his identity by remembering all his stages of consciousness.
Second of all, the matter we can actually experience, because we can perceive it — the body — eventually ceases to exist. Overall, none of the theories are flawless. So, the same person, Julia, had two bodies. The idea is that in a choice between psychological continuity or bodily continuity as being responsible for personal identity, Weirob would choose the latter.
This recognition does not come from a particular way the body moves, but by the unique behavior that is expressed and repeated to a point that the memory can identify it.
Another illustrative example that Sam provides is a baseball game. I have never heard of somebody who had their penmanship completely modified after memory loss—people tend to draw the letters in a certain way regardless.
The problem, Weirob summarizes, is that by the very nature of what a soul is--i.
Locke has to able to distinguish genuine memories from apparent ones real memories from pseudo-memories. There is no way we could know if the correlation really exists unless we physically experience.
The resulting person may remember having had red wine last week and liking the tagliatelle al ragu, but this person would only seem to be me. Perry also produces non-technical work that reaches a wider audience, such as his humorous online essay entitled "Structured Procrastination".
Descartes, Butler, Clarke, Reid, Chisholm, most of the Western religious tradition Reductionist Theories of PI PI reduces to fill in the blank Same body; same brain; memory; psychological continuity and connectedness; some combination of these?
In BJ, an exact psychological copy of a brain is made even though the copy may differ from the original in some physical respects. It is a new part of the game; nevertheless it is still the same game.
If we found that the water of a certain river was of a decidedly different quality, or it suddenly had entirely different fish, or our fishing hole was no longer there, etc.
In order for those parts to form a whole, a relative connection is necessary. Overall, they are still the same people they were before. Who she is now turns on not just her states of mind and their relation to my states of mind, but on the existence or nonexistence of other people.
With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. Rather, personal identity is the whole stretch of conscious moments, connected together in the right psychological way.
If I lose my memories, do I stop being me? Therefore, all the mannerisms, voice articulations, and other signs of subconscious memory-related qualities would be gone, and the resulting person would not be me. The body would not respond to stimuli the way my own would, therefore it would not be me.
And, I presume, if she was able to keep her old body, W says she would not hesitate to have a rejuvenated brain to replace her original brain.
For example, plastic surgery is very advanced nowadays—let us consider that a person can be modified as to be exactly like me, having the same facial characteristics, body type, even the same voice, but not the memories that make up my personality.
Unless there is a way of confirming the existence of a soul by any sort of technology or study, I do not see how this theory could be proven.
Third Night M has given up trying to convince W that disembodied survival is possible. In logic, Perry and Jon Barwise are known for discussion of the slingshot argumentespecially in their article "Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations". It is hard for me to accept it as well.
To this, C responds by saying that of course the memories are caused in the right way since they are traces made in a brain by the usual perceptual and physiological processes, and that brain has now simply been transferred to another body where it continues to work normally.
He received his B. That is, so long as there is psychological continuity--a continuous flow of consciousness or psychology--this is all that is need for a person to be the same person over time.
M plumps for the latter. In class we will discuss one of the flaws of this kind of argument: Weirob is careful to point out that there is a difference between actually remembering something and seeming to remember. But how, she wonders, does this help Miller prove that survival after death is possible?Start studying Presentation on John Perry's Dialogue on Personal Identity - Philo Quiz 2.
Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. by Neusa Facenda April Perry’s A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality gives an example of logical thinking and argumentation. More than theorizing, this text expresses ways of defending ideas and proving them to be true or more-likely-to-be-true than other ideas.
Perry On Personal Identity. What follows is a (long-ish!) summary of Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality.
1. The First Night The Challenge. Weirob challenges her friend Miller to comfort her on her death bed. Lectures: Perry. I. The problem of personal identity. Remember that the founders of analytic philosophy wanted to get away without doing metaphysics; they wanted only to do science; But it turned out that this was impossible.
They needed to account for a lot of things that traditional metaphysics did. At the end of the first dialogue. Personal Identity and Immortality I. Some Background (A) The Self The questions “Who am I?” “What am I?” and “Will I survive my bodily death?” are.
Perry's book A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a mortally wounded university professor, Gretchen Weirob.Download